3 that attempted refutation was inconclusive, as I argue in section 5, then the survival of deism up to and including the present turns out to represent a serious metaphysical option rather than a mere historical curiosity (section 6).
I: ROUSSEAU'S STANCE ON NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION
Rousseau's Émile, first published in 1762, includes the famous dialogue conducted on a mountain-top between a Savoyard priest or Vicaire and the young Émile. By prior agreement the subject of the dialogue is religious belief and its critics. In this context, the Vicaire conveys that the philosophers are of little or no help, each having a system, but each putting personal vanity before love of truth. (5) N.J.H. Dent suggests that this criticism applies to philosophy in general (6) , but Maurice Cranston points out that Rousseau's remarks here are directed mainly at the materialist metaphysics of philosophers such as Helvétius (7). This interpretation certainly coheres better with the high praise which shortly follows of "the illustrious Clarke", well-known both as a theologian and as a philosopher (and longsince translated into French for nonreaders of English such as Rousseau (8) ), even if this praise is consistent with reservations on Rousseau's part.
There is admittedly an undertone of faint praise in the passage about Clarke. Clarke's system "seems ... to contain fewer things which are beyond the understanding of the human mind" than the other systems, which "are full of absurdities". But as "Every system has its insoluble problems", ... "these difficulties are therefore no final arguments, against any system". While this remains praise of a highly qualified kind, there follows apparently unqualified acclamation: "Then comes the illustrious Clarke who gives light to the world and proclaims the Being of beings and the Giver of things. What universal admiration, what unanimous applause would have greeted this new system-a system so great, so illuminating and so simple" (9) . Clearly Rousseau's rejection of philosophy in matters of religion does not extend to the general kind of arguments for the being and attributes of God deployed by Clarke, 4 nor, accordingly, to natural theology. Not even the conditionality of "would have greeted" can be allowed to detract from this verdict, nor significantly to qualify the wholeheartedness of the Vicaire's admiration for Clarke in this passage. To Rousseau's overall attitude to Clarke I return in section II.
While the Savoyard proceeds to deploy his own version of the cosmological argument, and to argue for the existence, omnipotence and benevolence of God, it is clear that, for him, religion is grounded in a combination of reason and feeling, and develops at least as much out of conscience, the innate sense of justice, which he regards as God's voice, implanted in all human beings by the creator, as from arguments such as Clarke's, and such as his own. Yet reason in the form of the cosmological argument remains the mainstay of his position, as it was for the earlier deists. This entire stance, as Émile remarks, closely resembles natural religion, something which the orthodox wrongly regard as irreligion (10) .
On the subject of revelation, by contrast, the Savoyard declares an attitude of (at most) respectful doubt, at the same time conveying hostility to the confusions and contradictions of supposedly revealed doctrines. His tone here diverges hugely from that of Clarke and again resembles instead that of the English deists, except insofar as one of their number (Tindal) detected implicit but unintentional deism in Clarke (11) .
Likewise miracles are treated as an impediment to faith in the author of the regular laws of nature (12) , rather as most of the English deists had treated them. The beauty of the Gospel is recognised, and yet the Savoyard also declares it "full of incredible things, things repugnant to reason, things which no natural man can understand or accept" (13) . Before submitting his reason to such things, reasons must be given him, he insists (14) ; this is where the defenders of revelation fail.
Hence his exposition of religious matters, without explicitly rejecting revelation outright, credits nothing but natural religion. God is to be worshipped, but dogmas 5 with no bearing on morality are to be ignored, says the Savoyard, in a passage reminiscent of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (15) . God is to be served according to knowledge based on reason, and feelings based on natural law as recognised by conscience. Nothing more is needed; indeed revelations are probably to be rejected, as degrading God by investing him with passions like our own (16) . As Reason asserts, in dialogue with Inspiration, "He who denies the right of reason, must convince me without recourse to her aid"; appeals against the deliverances of reason are either covert appeals to reason, or they are groundless (17) .
There is no reason to doubt that the exposition of the Savoyard broadly expresses Rousseau's personal position certainly about religion and largely about metaphysics too, although, as Roger D. Masters argues, Rousseau seems to have preferred not to acknowledge that he held these views, nor to make them part of his official philosophical system, granted his professed epistemological view that because of the limits of human reason these questions are beset with uncertainty, by contrast with matters of history and of morals (18) . Despite his reluctance to profess these views as his official philosophical position about religion, and despite his continuing awareness that all systems were open to objections, these views certainly appear to have been his authentic, deliberate and persistent personal sentiments from around his fortieth year onwards, as he was to affirm explicitly in his later years (19) .
II: ROUSSEAU AND 'THE ILLUSTRIOUS CLARKE'
Besides championing the cosmological argument, Samuel Clarke argued in favour of revelation, of the consilience of natural religion and Christianity, and of the reasonableness of revelation in the light of the evidence of miracles and other signs.
Human depravity makes the Christian revelation indispensable. Thus not only did he criticise individual deists such as Toland; his overall stance was fiercely hostile to deism in general (20) . Accordingly, and despite the stance of the Savoyard on themes concerning revelation (noted in the previous section), the apparent praise on the part 6 of this same character for Clarke and his philosophical system may seem an obstacle to the thesis that Rousseau supplies a viable defence of deism.
However, the areas of agreement between the Savoyard and Clarke are limited. Both subscribe to the cosmological argument, albeit in somewhat different forms. And both maintain that matter cannot be the original source of motion in the universe, and is incapable of feeling and perception; and also that human beings are capable of initiating movement, and of freedom of thought and will (21) . However, the Savoyard does not regard the cosmological argument as a demonstration of God's existence (as opposed to the least doubtful solution to the 'insuperable problems' which can be raised against any metaphysical system); his faith is based as much on appeals to experiential considerations as on this argument. Already we find a complete divergence of epistemological method, reflected in the frequent appeals of the Savoyard to observation and experience (22) .
There are also differences of substance. Thus Clarke denies that physical sensation is an attribute of the body, whereas the Savoyard holds that sensations are determined by material processes, and that the soul is limited to activities of willing and reflection (23) . For Clarke, morality is grounded in truths known to God and knowable by humanity, but for the Savoyard it is discerned by conscience, which naturally imparts the duties that human beings should follow, whereas rationalism in ethics leads us astray (24) . And while, for Clarke, God's existence is conceptually necessary (25) , the Savoyard's conclusion is that God "exists of himself alone", an independence that would seem not to betoken conceptually necessary existence, and further that while everything else depends on God, his nature is largely hidden and eludes human attempts at understanding (26) .
So there are large differences both of method and of substance, independent of the antithetical approaches of Clarke and the Savoyard to the claims of Christian 7 revelation. In this connection, Clarke in fact held that people who accept natural religion but deny revelation are on a slippery slope to atheism. Yet the stance pilloried by Clarke was the very position of the Savoyard (27) , despite his professed admiration of Clarke, and there is no reason to doubt that it was also the position of Rousseau himself, who could actually have cited his broad agreement with Clarke over natural religion as well as his distrust of philosophical systems to resist any charge of creeping atheism against himself.
The Savoyard's high praise of Clarke has to be set alongside these huge divergences. Butler's overall stance is that there is a significant probability that Christianity is true, and that, since 'to us, probability is the very guide of life' (30), we ought, on grounds of prudence, to be guided in a matter of such importance by this probability. While revealed religion is less than certain, the obstacles to acceptance of its distinctive tenets are no stronger than the obstacles to acceptance of natural religion (including belief in God's existence and purposive government of nature), which deists profess 8 to accept, and the probabilities concerned are comparable, granted that the limits of human faculties prevent more than probable belief in both cases (31 claims [sc. of natural religion] in the face of the objections to them, we should be willing to do the same for the claims of revelation' (32) . Besides (and here Butler steps outside analogical reasoning to develop a line of argument which, as we have seen, was deployed also by Clarke), the 'claims of revelation are supported by special evidences such as miracles [and] fulfilled prophecies' (33) and this enhances the rationality of accepting them, a conclusion that was to be firmly rejected by Rousseau (34) .
What is particularly strange in someone taking this stance is Butler's apparent acceptance of the Cosmological Argument, again as presented by Samuel Clarke.
This argument is recognised as an a priori proof in the Introduction of Analogy (35) , and is summarised with approval in the main text (36) . But an a priori proof offers a far higher degree of probability for its conclusion than mere analogical reasoning or than just a significant probability of not being false. To be consistent with his other remarks about probability, Butler would have to claim that there are severe limits to the degree of probability offered even by this argument, invoking (imaginably) considerations such as the finitude of human faculties. Otherwise he would have to choose between retracting the claim that nothing stronger than probability is to be had in matters of religion, and thus the basis of his architectonic argument from analogy, and retracting his endorsement of the a priori argument. Yet this latter option would involve the risk that readers persuaded by such a retractation might abandon their deism, and thus cease to be open to persuasion by Butler's central argument. Besides, Butler has strong motives for avoiding any move which might detract from the high probability (if not the certainty) of the doctrines of natural religion; for, as Penelhum remarks, 'this, and only this, permits him to follow in Aquinas's footsteps and say 9 that revelation supplements and completes them, and is rendered more rationally acceptable by the assumption of their truth' (37) .
At other times, however, and in other contexts, Butler has strong motives for representing the doctrines of natural religion as only moderately likely. These motives arise, as Penelhum points out, when he is arguing that the evidence of nature does not unambiguously support these doctrines, but is significantly supplemented if the claims of revelation are accepted. Penelhum's example of a doctrine regarded in this light by Butler is the doctrine that God rewards virtue and punishes vice (38) . The application of this argument to this particular doctrine could be avoided by deists by relegating it from the central doctrines of natural religion, or by not counting it as one of these in the first place.
Meanwhile, as Penelhum recognises, Butler is open to criticism for using 'probable' in some phases of his argument to mean 'highly probable' and in others to mean merely 'having some degree of likelihood' (39) . Such equivocation already paves the way for one form of deistic reply to Butler: if the doctrines of natural religion are highly probable, then they are not genuinely analogous with those of revealed religion, but if they are represented as no more probable than those of revealed religion, this undermines the serious possibility of regarding them as a more or less reliable basis fit to be supplemented with the claims of revealed religion, and at the same time may well under-represent the various grounds for accepting them.
IV: ROUSSEAU'S CRITIQUE
A further reply to Butler is, I want to suggest, supplied unawares by Rousseau through the mouth of the Savoyard; it also comprises a tacit but probably a conscious and deliberate reply to Clarke's revelationism. For Rousseau's character, after presenting at length a reasoned case for natural religion, points out that revealed religion is entirely dependent for its credibility on reason, and in several ways at that. Effectively, the upshot is that the Savoyard's religious beliefs consist, as he expounds them, in 'nothing but natural religion' (47), despite his overt respect for certain instances of purported revelation. While this need not be taken as Rousseau's official stance on religion, his character nevertheless explains and defends this position to Émile in ways that could serve among responses to advocates of revealed religion such as Clarke and Butler. Thus there can be no blame or guilt for those not submitting to purported revelations 'so long as I serve God according to the knowledge he has given to my mind, and the feelings he has put into my heart'; according, that is, to the deliverances of reason and of conscience (48) . No benefit either to morals or to worthwhile beliefs can be derived from 'positive doctrine which cannot be derived without the aid of this doctrine by the right use of my faculties' (49) . If a benevolent God exists, he conveys all that is needed in religion 'to our conscience and to our reason' (assisted by our senses); otherwise he is not benevolent.
Besides, while this does not yet rule out the possibility of God speaking to our faculties through revelations imparted to others, in fact the purported revelations of others, far from adding anything valuable, tend to add contradictions, to ascribe to God degrading and excessively human attitudes, and to generate pride, intolerance and cruelty among believers (50) . While this critique of revelation in general might seem too sweeping, and might leave one or another purported revelation relatively unscathed, it forms only part of the Savoyard's case, which proceeds to a detailed appraisal (too detailed to be considered here) of the credibility of particular revelations and of apparently supportive items such as alleged miracles.
Characteristic is the claim that the creator of rational creatures cannot be supposed with any consistency to expect these creatures to subject their reason to authority, or to supposedly revealed teachings that are less clear, simple or comprehensible than the teachings of natural religion (51). Though probability was not Rousseau's central concern, as it was Butler's, the Savoyard is allowed to raise numerous issues surrounding the probability and credibility of revealed religion and its particular manifestations. Indeed these epistemological concerns cohere well with Rousseau's characteristic stress on the uncertainty of reasoning in the field of metaphysics, an emphasis that could be held in some ways to match Butler's stress on the limits of human knowledge, particularly in matters that transcend nature, and with Rousseau's further characteristic recognition that he had never been able to remove all the difficulties facing his personal religious and metaphysical beliefs. Thus the assumptions of the two writers were not completely at variance. But with Rousseau, the self-consciousness that awareness of epistemological limits can generate consistently takes the form, at least in the discourse of the Savoyard, of scrutinising the reasonableness of doctrines whose adherents allege them to be above reason and above question (52) , the authenticity of related texts, and the probability of related claims about prophecies or miracles (53) . Hume and Kant. In particular, the deism of the Savoyard, and thus probably of Rousseau, can be defended against at least eighteenth-century criticism. This was not (as it may be worth re-emphasising) the kind of deism that represents God as an absentee designer, responsible for nothing but initiating the cosmic process, but (as has been mentioned above) the deism of a deity discernible from nature, from reason and from conscience, rather than from revelation (in the sense of 'special revelation(s)').
Such deism has to defend itself on at least two fronts. Against scepticism about religion it deploys (besides arguments from conscience) arguments such as the cosmological argument, and can, I have argued, avoid the pitfalls identified by philosophers such as Hume and Kant. Against revelationists such as Clarke and
Butler it deploys its own critique of revelation, and challenges them to give reasons, if they can, for abandoning reason (that is, for abandoning reasoning and reasons) in favour of religious authority.
Rousseau's deism could be enlarged upon and defended better than is done in Émile.
Thus it could be updated in matters of epistemology so as to secure immunity from possible charges of hypostatising the faculty of reason, supplemented through detailed text-based scrutinies of purported revelations such as the critique of the Bible on the part of Hermann Samuel Reimarus (as published posthumously by Lessing (81)), and could be upheld with a more vigorous presentation of the cosmological argument than that of Rousseau (82), a more explicit version of the teleological argument (83) , and a more persuasive theodicy with regard to physical evil (84) .
More recent developments would also require such deism to be related to evolution and to Big Bang cosmology. But short of a latter-day vindication of Hume's Fork, or of some semantic counterpart concerning the limits of intelligibility (such as the Verification Principle threatened but failed to be), there is every reason to consider it capable of such revision, and thus a metaphysical option for the third millennium, and not just a footnote to the history of philosophy of the eighteenth century. 
